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Proportion responding (PR) is the preference for proportionally higher gains, such that the same absolute quantity is valued
more as the reference group decreases. This research investigated this kind of proportion PR in decisions about saving lives
(e.g., saving 10/10 lives is preferred to saving 10/100 lives). The results of two studies suggest that PR does not stem from an
overall tendency to choose higher proportions, but rather from faulty deliberative reasoning. In particular, people who display
PR are less likely to engage in deliberative reflection as measured by response time, the Process Dissociation Procedure,
the Cognitive Reflection Test, a numeracy test, and a task assessing denominator neglect. This association between faulty
deliberation and PR was observed only when choosing the highest proportion was non-normative because it came at the
expense of absolute gains (e.g., saving 10/10 lives is preferred to saving 11/100 lives). These results help to make sense of
discrepant findings in previous research, pertaining to how PR relates to biased reasoning and decision making.
Keywords: proportion dominance, cognitive reflection, numeracy, denominator neglect, value of life, normativity.
1 Introduction
People evaluate a program that can save 2 out of 4 people
more favorably than a program that can save 2 out of 112
(Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997) because the proportion of the
reference group that is saved is higher in the first case than
in the second. This preference for the higher proportion can
be so strong as to lead people to forego an option with the
higher absolute number of gains. For instance, people have
been shown to prefer saving 225 of 300 people rather than
saving 230 of 920 (Bartels, 2006). This sensitivity to relative
savings even when absolute savings are reduced has been
termed proportion dominance (Bartels, 2006; Finucane, Pe-
ters & Slovic, 2003), the reference group effect (Jenni &
Loewenstein, 1997), drop-in-the-bucket thinking (Bartels &
Burnett, 2011), or psychophysical numbing (Friedrich et al.,
1999; Slovic, 2007), and it is widely replicated (Baron,
1997; Bartels & Burnett, 2011; Erlandsson, Björklund &
Bäckström, 2014, 2015; Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson
& Friedrich, 1997; Friedrich et al., 1999; Kleber, Dickert,
Peters & Florack, 2013; Kogut & Beyth-Marom, 2008).
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This kind of proportion responding (PR) has been dis-
cussed as a case that violates normative tenets of judgment
and decision making, as the value of a life should not change
as a function of the size of the reference group (Baron, 1997;
Bartels, 2006; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997; Friedrich et al.,
1999; Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Peters, Slovic, Västfjäll
&Mertz, 2008; Slovic, 2007), and especially not to the point
of justifying foregoing the chance to save more lives. Bartels
(2006) found PR even when decision makers were in a joint
evaluation mode (Hsee, 1996), and it was therefore clear
that PR leads to saving fewer lives. Furthermore, Bartels
found that, even though people recognize that PR is wrong
in these cases when they are retrospectively asked to judge
what weight should absolute vs. relative numbers have for
their judgments, these retrospective judgments do not re-
flect people’s actual PR-biased judgments (as also found by
Kogut & Beyth-Marom, 2008). In this paper, I use PR to re-
fer to attention to proportion, and I distinguish between non-
normative and normative types of PR, depending on whether
PR leads to a worse outcome or not, respectively.
The present studies test whether PR stems from faulty
thinking, that is, a failure to engage in deliberative think-
ing, or whether it originates in a general tendency to engage
in proportional reasoning and prefer proportional gains over
absolute ones.
1.1 Is PR related to faulty deliberation?
The findings from extant research are mixed in this regard.
On the one hand, Bartels (2006) showed that PR correlates
with a low disposition to think in a reflective manner (though
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those studies did not assess subjects’ actual ability to think
reflectively, but rather relied only on a self-report measure
of thinking style: the Rational-Experiential Inventory of Ep-
stein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier, 1996). On the other hand,
Kleber et al. (2013) showed that PR is associated with hav-
ing higher numerical reasoning skills. Adding to the mixed
pile of findings, Peters et al. (2008) found that numeracy
was not related to PR, although the precision of numerical
representation influenced choices, albeit in a negative way:
more precision was associated with choosing the propor-
tionally superior but normatively incorrect option. Finally,
Stanovich and West (2008) also found that PR is unrelated
to cognitive ability as measured by subjects’ SAT scores.
One possible reason for these seemingly discrepant find-
ings is that previous research has sometimes investigated PR
when it clearly violates normativity, whereas in other stud-
ies this is not the case. Indeed, in many studies, PR does
not necessarily constitute a violation of normativity, because
both options are equal in absolute numbers and only vary in
proportions, and therefore PR does not come at the expense
of sacrificing a greater absolute number of lives (Jenni &
Lowenstein, 1997; see also Erlandsson et al., 2014, 2015;
Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997, Studies 1 & 2; Friedrich et al.,
1999; Kleber et al., 2013, Study 2). However, in other stud-
ies, PR is clearly non-normative: the option with the highest
value of relative savings has the lowest value in absolute
savings (Bartels, 2006; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997, Study
3; Kleber et al., 2013, Studies 1 & 3; Peters et al., 2008).
The present research tested whether the preference for
higher proportions relates to intuitive thinking, as a function
of whether it violates normative standards or not. Rather
than expecting preference for higher proportions to be asso-
ciated with intuitive reasoning overall, we expect that to be
the case only when it is non-normative. This is because, in
that case, the proportionally superior option should still be
compelling, but people should realize that it is not correct
(Bartels, 2006; Kogut & Beyth-Marom, 2008).
The present studies provide an exhaustive set of tests of
how PR relates to intuitive thinking vs. careful deliberative
reasoning. First, they test whether PR correlates with poor
performance in other reasoning tasks: a choice task assess-
ing denominator neglect (Bonner & Newell, 2010; Denes-
Raj & Epstein, 1994), the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT;
Frederick, 2005), and numeracy (Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer,
2001). Furthermore, these studies examine response times
and test whether non-normative PR is based on hastier re-
sponses, another indicator that careful reflection was not
used in the decision-making process. In addition, the present
research applies the Process Dissociation Procedure (Ja-
coby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993) to assess to
what extent controlled/deliberative thought processes (or a
lack thereof) contribute to PR.
1.2 Is PR related to a tendency to think pro-
portionally?
An alternative to the faulty deliberation hypothesis (though
not mutually exclusive) is that PR stems from an overall ten-
dency to think proportionally and always choose the higher
proportion, regardless of whether that is the normatively
correct option or not.
Studies on the development of mathematical reasoning
reveal situations where people over-apply proportional rea-
soning: Van Dooren, De Bock, Hessels, Janssens, and Ver-
schaffel (2005) found that 1) at early ages, students are not
capable of reasoning proportionally; 2) later on, students be-
come more capable of proportional reasoning, but they also
start to over-apply it to situations where it is not called for,
as in the following problem: “Ellen and Kim are running
around a track. They run equally fast but Ellen started later.
When Ellen has run 4 laps, Kim has run 12 laps. When Ellen
has run 24 laps, how many has Kim run?” So, with increas-
ing numerical reasoning capacity, students engage in more
proportional reasoning, but they do so both when it is cor-
rect and when it is not. And 3) only at a later developmental
stage do most people acquire the ability to judge whether
they should use proportional reasoning or not.
That research further suggests that the proportional re-
sponse might be so extensively practiced in school that it be-
comes the prepotent heuristic or intuitive response (Gillard,
Van Dooren, Schaeken & Verschaffel, 2009), which must be
overridden by effortful and time-consuming reflective think-
ing (see also Kogut & Beyth-Marom, 2008). Consistent with
this hypothesis, Gillard et al. showed that constraining re-
sponse time or imposing cognitive load on reasoners had lit-
tle influence on their ability to answer correctly to problems
where proportional thinking is appropriate, but it made them
more likely to over-apply proportional thinking to problems
where that kind of thinking is not appropriate (problems like
the aforementioned one, about the two runners).
Therefore, it might be that PR results from a tendency to
over-apply proportional reasoning. If that is the case, then
we should find that the same people who are prone to PR
also show a preference for proportionally superior options
in other choice domains. In this regard, the denominator
neglect task that is used in Study 1 provides an important
test.
Denominator neglect can be instantiated in the following
example: When people are asked to choose an urn from
which to draw a ball that might grant them a prize, and they
can choose from either a small urn with 1 prized ball out
of 10 balls in total or a large urn with 9 prized balls out of
100, many people go for the option with the highest number
of prized balls even though the odds of winning are lower
(Bonner & Newell, 2010; Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994).
Avoiding this bias takes time (Bonner & Newell, 2010; Fer-
reira et al., 2016) and working memory resources (Ferreira,
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Garcia-Marques, Sherman & Sherman, 2006), which are
characteristics of reflection/deliberation in dual-process the-
ories.
In Study 1, subjects completed different tasks that as-
sessed PR and denominator neglect. This offers a strong
test of whether biased reasoning contributes to PR or not,
given that PR and denominator neglect are opposite biases:
PR consists of valuing the higher proportion and neglect-
ing absolute frequencies, whereas denominator neglect con-
sists of choosing the highest absolute frequency even when
that does not correspond to the highest proportion. There-
fore, if PR results from an overall tendency to engage in
proportional reasoning, then it should even help to prevent
denominator neglect. But if PR comes from a tendency
to engage in a biased tendency to unreflectively follow the
more compelling or intuitive answer, particularly when PR
is not normative, then it should be associated with a ten-
dency for denominator neglect. Indeed, Ayal, Hochman,
and Zakay (2011) showed that people with a low disposition
to engage in rational thinking (as measured by the Rational-
Experiential Inventory) tend to commit such opposite biases.
2 Study 1
This first study tests whether PR is associated with quick
response times, denominator neglect (an indicator of poor
reflection but greater attention to proportions; Pacini & Ep-
stein, 1999; Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011), and lower
scores on the controlled parameter of the Process Dissoci-
ation Procedure, depending on whether PR is normative or
not.
The denominator neglect task was adapted so as to use
the Process Dissociation Procedure, which has proven apt
to dissect judgment and decision making biases and exam-
ine the extent to which automatic vs. controlled thought
processes underlie them (Ferreira et al., 2006, 2016; Mata,
Ferreira & Reis, 2013; Mata, Fiedler, Ferreira & Almeida,
2013). The logic of this procedure requires having harmony
trials, where automatic and controlled processes suggest the
same response, and conflict trials, where the different kinds
of processes lead to different responses. The conflict trials
are those that are typically used in this task, whereby the op-
tion with the higher numerator is different from the option
with the higher proportion (e.g., 1/10 vs. 9/100). In harmony
trials, on the other hand, the option with the higher numer-
ator is the same as the option with the higher proportion
(e.g., 1/10 vs. 11/100). Comparing performance in harmony
and conflict allows for independent estimates of automatic
and controlled processing in people’s reasoning (seeMethod
section below). Therefore, the inclusion of the denominator
neglect task enabled us to calculate the strength of subjects’
controlled and automatic thought processes in an indepen-
dent task and then assess how well each of these predicts
PR. It is expected that the estimate of automatic processing
does not vary as a function of whether people show PR in
their choices or not, suggesting that the proportion dominant
choice is equally compelling for all responders regardless of
whether they end up overriding that response tendency or
not. Rather, PR should relate to lower controlled process-
ing, especially when PR is non-normative and people should
therefore override the tendency to choose the higher propor-
tion.
The Process Dissociation Procedure enables a fine-
grained distinction of the kinds of processes that contribute
to PR. In previous research using self-report measures (Bar-
tels, 2006), PR was examined in relation to a relative mea-
sure of the degree to which the rational subscale score out-
weighed the intuitive score. Therefore, it is not clear from
that research whether PR is due to more rational/deliberative
thinking or less intuitive thinking. Kogut and Beyth-Marom
(2008) make the specific prediction that PR is a bias that
results from “the intuitive, automatic system (. . . ) which
failed to be corrected by the analytical, rational system”
(p. 604). Given that the Process Dissociation Procedure
aims to assess the independent contribution of these kinds
of thought processes, the procedure can provide a test of the
association between PR and reduced deliberation.
Finally, this study assesses response time, as yet another
measure of reflection. As with the other indicators of reflec-
tion, it is expected that response time relates to PR (i.e., PR
should be associated with quicker responses), but only when
PR is non-normative.
2.1 Method
Subjects. One hundred Psychology undergraduates par-
ticipated for partial course credit.
Procedure and design. Subjects were given three scenar-
ios to read (presented in a different random order for each
subject) involving decisions to save the lives of people or
animals (see Appendix A). As an example, in one of the
scenarios, subjects were asked to imagine that two houses
were on fire, and that they had to decide whether to save ei-
ther all 10 people that were in a small house, or another 10
people from a total of 100 that were in a big house. In the
non-normative condition, the second option involved saving
11 out of 100, such that it represented the lower proportion
but the higher absolute number.
There were two conditions, counterbalanced between-
subjects, which varied on whether PR was non-normative
or not. Subjects were randomly assigned to either the non-
normative PR condition (the scenarios were about saving
10/10 or 11/100) or the condition where PR did not vio-
late normativity (the scenarios were about saving 10/10 or
10/100).
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Table 1: Correlations of number of PR choices with other measures by normativity (p levels in parentheses).
Denominator neglect
conflict harmony equal C A Response time
PR non-normative .41 (.003) –.40 (.005) .12 (.403) –.49 (.000) –.07 (.631) –.39 (.005)
PR normative –.06 (.692) .15 (.304) .13 (.363) .13 (.372) .23 (.120) .24 (.087)
For the denominator neglect task, subjects were asked to
imagine that they were playing a game where they could
draw one ball from one of two trays containing red balls and
white balls. To win this game, subjects were told that they
would have to draw a red ball. They could choose to draw
a random ball from a small tray (e.g., containing 1 red ball
out of 10 balls in total) or from a large tray (e.g., contain-
ing 9 red balls out of 100 balls in total; see instructions in
Appendix A).
Unlike the instructions for the proportion dominance task,
which required reading detailed trial-specific scenarios, the
instructions for the denominator neglect task were simple
and constant across trials, which enabled subjects to quickly
perform this task over many trials. We wished to have a
high quantity and diversity of trials so that we could have
reliable Process Dissociation estimates. Specifically, having
many trials, and trials of different sorts, was meant to make
it more tempting for subjects to go with their gut feeling in
some trials and not always decide in a calculating fashion.
Indeed, it is sometimes hard to obtain biased responses in
this task with a small number of trials (e.g., Pacini & Ep-
stein, 1999), and an invariant correct performance makes it
difficult to estimate the automatic/heuristic parameter of the
Process Dissociation Procedure (Ferreira et al., 2006).
There were several kinds of trials in the denominator ne-
glect task (adapted from Bonner & Newell, 2010). The
small tray had between 1 and 3 red balls out of 10 balls in to-
tal (i.e., 1/10, 2/10 or 3/10), and the large tray had a number
of red balls out of a total of 100 such that the proportion of
winning was 4% lower, 1% lower, equal, 1% higher, or 4%
higher as compared to the small tray (e.g., 1/10 vs. 6/100,
1/10 vs. 9/100, 1/10 vs. 10/100, 1/10 vs. 11/100, 1/10 vs.
14/100). Crossing these factors produced 15 different trials:
6 harmony trials where the option with the larger numera-
tor also corresponded to the larger proportion; 3 equal trials
where the proportion was the same for both options; and
6 conflict trials where the option with the larger numerator
was not the one with the larger proportion. Each trial was
presented 17 times throughout the task. The resulting 255
trials were divided into 4 blocks, in the middle of which each
of the 3 problems assessing proportion dominance was pre-
sented (i.e., 1 PR problem in each interval between blocks
of the denominator neglect trials).
The A and C parameters of the Process Dissociation Pro-
cedure (referring to “automatic” and “controlled” process-
ing, respectively) were calculated according to the following
analytical procedure (Ferreira et al., 2006): In harmony tri-
als, because automatic/intuitive and controlled/deliberative
thought processes concur on the choice, the probability of
choosing the option with both the larger numerator and
the larger proportion is C + A(1 − C). In conflict trials,
where intuitive and deliberative thought suggest different
responses, the option with the larger numerator will be se-
lected only if deliberative thought fails (as the proportion is
smaller in this case), as a consequence of intuitive thought,
and therefore the probability of choosing the larger numera-
tor isA(1−C). Based on the previous equations, it is possi-
ble to calculateC as the difference of probabilities of choos-
ing the larger numerator in harmony versus conflict trials
(i.e., plargenumerator/harmony − plargenumerator/conflict),
and A as plargenumerator/conflict/(1− C).
2.2 Results and discussion
The proportion of problems in which subjects chose the PR
option was higher when PR did not violate normativity than
when it was non-normative, M = .62, SD = .29 vs. M = .35,
SD = .38, t(90.61) = 3.94, p < .001. One-sample t tests
comparing the number of PR choices against 50/50 revealed
that most subjects preferred the PR option when it did not
violate normativity, but chose against it when it was non-
normative, ps ≤ .009.
Table 1 shows the correlations of normative and non-
normative PR with the proportion of denominator-neglect
trials where the subjects chose the option with the higher
numerator across the three kinds of trials, the process disso-
ciation parameters, and the average response times on PR
problems (response times were log-transformed; see Rat-
cliff, 1993).
Subjects who made more non-normative PR choices were
also more likely to make more non-normative choices in the
denominator neglect problems (i.e., choosing the higher nu-
merator but lower proportion in conflict trials, and choosing
the lower numerator and lower proportion in harmony tri-
als). They also scored lower on the C parameter of the Pro-
cess Dissociation Procedure. (The equivalent analysis for
the A parameter revealed no significant effect.) And they
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took less time to make their choices in the PR task. In con-
trast, when PR was not against normativity, choices did not
correlate with any of the other measures.
The results of Study 1 suggest that PR seems to result not
from a general preference for higher proportions, but rather
from faulty deliberative reasoning. That is, non-normative
responding in one task correlates with non-normative re-
sponding in another task, whereas there was no evidence
for a correlation based on differences in the tendency to re-
spond in terms of proportions regardless of the task. Study 2
provides further tests of the deliberation-failure hypothesis.
3 Study 2
Whereas in Study 1 the normativity of PR was manipulated
between subjects, in Study 2 all subjects solved PR prob-
lems where the PR option meant saving fewer lives or more
lives overall. Respectively, these two kinds of problems con-
stitute conflict vs. harmony trials, and comparing choices
across them makes it possible to compute Process Dissocia-
tion estimates. Moreover, this is a better way to manipulate
normativity than the normative condition used in Study 1,
where, even though PR did not entail sacrificing more lives
(i.e., both options involved the same absolute number, only
the proportions varied), it was not clear what the correct op-
tion was, as there was not an option with a higher absolute
number. Subjects also completed the CRT and a numeracy
scale.
Several hypotheses were tested: First, if people recognize
the non-normativity of PR in conflict trials, where PR im-
plies saving fewer lives, then PR should be lower in those tri-
als than in harmony trials. This would replicate the between-
conditions difference that was found in Study 1. Second,
as the CRT and the numeracy scale measure the tendency
to think deliberatively about the problem at hand, scores
on these tests should relate negatively to PR in conflict tri-
als (i.e., non-normative PR) and positively to the C scores
of the Process Dissociation Procedure (i.e., the ability to
choose PR depending on whether it is normative or not).
Finally, in terms of response times, in harmony trials, decid-
ing quickly or deliberatively should both lead to the same
decision: choosing the PR-option. However, in conflict tri-
als, one should take longer to reflect on whether or not the
PR-option is correct and give the other response. Therefore,
just as in Study 1, decision time should not predict choices
in harmony trials, but it should do so in conflict trials, with
normative responses (to not choose the PR option) taking
more time than non-normative ones.
3.1 Method
Subjects. One hundred subjects were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (104 ended up participating, as
Table 2: Correlations of number of PR choices with other
measures by normativity (p levels in parentheses).
Numeracy CRT Response time
PR non-normative –.20 (.047) –.26 (.008) –.31 (.001)
PR normative .20 (.040) .12 (.209) –.04 (.720)
C .27 (.006) .30 (.002) .32 (.001)
A .02 (.844) –.04 (.742) –.14 (.223)
Note. The mean response time in the top rows is specific
to type of trial (non-normative or normative PR). In the
bottom rows it is averaged across trials.
4 subjects did not sign up for compensation and were there-
fore not registered on Mechanical Turk as having taken part
in the study). Subjects were located in the United States and
were required to have an approval rate in previous assign-
ments of at least 95%.
Procedure and design. Subjects were given ten scenar-
ios to read, involving decisions to save the lives of people
or other species (some of these were adapted from Bartels,
2006; see Appendix B). For half of them – the conflict tri-
als – the PR option was different from the option where the
highest absolute number of lives could be saved. For the
other half – the harmony trials – the PR option was also the
option where the highest absolute number of lives could be
saved. The different scenarios were presented in random or-
der.
After the scenarios, subjects responded to an adapted ver-
sion of the CRT and to the Lipkus et al. (2001) Numeracy
Scale (Appendix B).
3.2 Results and discussion
In harmony trials, where PR was the normative option, the
proportion of PR choices was higher than in conflict trials,
where PR violated normativity, M = .92, SD = .17 vs. M =
.52, SD = .38, paired t(104) = 10.05, p < . 001.
Table 2 shows the correlations of CRT, numeracy and av-
erage (log-transformed) response times with normative and
non-normative PR.
Subjects who made more non-normative PR choices
scored lower on both the CRT and the numeracy test, and
they also took less time to make their choices. In con-
trast, in harmony trials, PR choices correlate only with nu-
meracy, and not with CRT score, nor with response time.
Sinayev and Peters’ (2015) indices of calculation (i.e., num-
ber of correct responses) and reflection (i.e., number of non-
intuitive responses, both correct and incorrect) do not differ
in terms of the correlations between CRT and the other mea-
sures.
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Additionally, having higher C Process-Dissociation
scores correlated with taking longer to decide on the PR
scenarios overall, whereas the A scores did not (see Table
2).
4 General discussion
This research investigated people’s preference for relative
gains (i.e., PR) in decisions about saving lives. Even though
many people refrained from showing PR when it came at
the expense of absolute gains – in this particular case, at the
expense of lives – a large percentage of subjects showed PR
even when that was the case (35% in Study 1, and 52% in
Study 2). Corroborating the non-normative nature of PR in
this case, subjects who chose higher proportions when that
meant saving fewer lives overall were also more likely to
display biased decision making in another domain (denom-
inator neglect; Study 1); they manifested lower engagement
in deliberative reflection, as measured by response times
(Studies 1 and 2), the C score of the Process Dissociation
Procedure (Study 1), the CRT and a numeracy scale (Study
2). Furthermore, the ability to choose for or against PR de-
pending on whether it is normative or not (as measured by
the C parameter of the Process Dissociation Procedure) cor-
related positively with measures of deliberative reasoning,
such as taking longer to respond and scoring higher on the
CRT and numeracy (Study 2).
These results, together with the fact that most people pre-
fer the PR option when it does not violate normativity (e.g.,
preferring to save 10/10 instead of 10/100 in Study 1), sup-
port the notion that PR is a compelling prepotent response
tendency, and that deliberative reasoning is required in or-
der to judge its appropriateness and override it, if need be
(Gillard et al., 2009; Kogut & Beyth-Marom, 2008; Van
Dooren et al., 2005).
This deliberation-failure hypothesis seems to account bet-
ter for PR than an overall preference for higher proportions.
Indeed, if it were the case that PR comes from an overall
tendency to think proportionally, then those subjects who
displayed PR in Study 1 should be less likely to show de-
nominator neglect, but the opposite was the case.
These results help to make sense of some seemingly dis-
crepant findings in previous research, with regard to whether
PR relates to biased reasoning and decision making. Those
studies considered only scenarios where PR was normative
or scenarios where it was not normative. Results were there-
fore mixed (cf. Bartels, 2006; Kleber et al., 2013; Peters et
al., 2008; Stanovich & West, 2008). The present studies
systematically investigated the role of deliberative thinking
in PR depending on whether PR is normative or not. The
results form a consistent picture. To summarize: PR is a
compelling prepotent response option (Gillard et al., 2009;
Kogut & Beyth-Marom, 2008). People can override this ten-
dency and forego PR when it is not normative, but this re-
quires the ability to engage in careful deliberation.
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Appendix A: Tasks used in Study 1
Proportion Dominance: People Scenario
Imagine that in a town two houses are on fire: a big house
with 100 people inside and a small house with 10 people
inside. In this town there is only one fire engine, so you
have to decide which of the two houses you will send the
fire engine to. You only have time to save one of the houses.
If you choose to send the fire engine to the small house,
you are certain to save exactly 10 out of the 10 people in that
house.
If you choose to send the fire engine to the big house, you
are certain to save exactly 10 out of the 100 people in that
house.
What house would you send the fire engine to?
Proportion Dominance: Pandas Scenario
Imagine that in a forest there are two wild life reserves
where panda bears live: a small reserve with 10 pandas and
a big one with 100 pandas. A fire is burning in this forest
and will eventually consume all of it. The two reserves are
located far from each other, so you have time to try to save
only one of the reserves.
If you choose to go to the small reserve, you are certain
to save exactly 10 out of the 10 pandas in that reserve.
If you choose to go to the big reserve, you are certain to
save exactly 10 out of the 100 pandas in that reserve.
Which reserve would you choose to go to?
Proportion Dominance: Horses Scenario
Imagine that a train is running lose and it is going so fast
that it is impossible to stop it. All you can do is direct it to
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one of two tracks: track A where there are 10 horses or track
B where there are 100 horses.
If the train goes down track A, all 10 horses in that track
will die; but all the horses in track B will live.
If the train goes down track B, 10 out of the 100 horses in
that track will die; but all the horses in track A will live.
Which track would you direct the train to?
Denominator Neglect
We want you to imagine that you are playing a game.
In this game you are presented with two trays: a small
tray with 10 balls and a large tray with 100 balls.
Each tray contains a certain number of red balls and white
balls.
Imagine that in this game you get a prize if you draw a
red ball.
You can only draw one ball from one of the two trays to
try and draw the winning red ball. Your task is to choose
which of the two trays - the small or the large - you want to
draw a ball from.
Throughout the experiment you will play this game a
great number of times. Your task in every game is the same:
choose which tray you would like to draw a ball from.
Appendix B: Tasks used in Study 2
Proportion Dominance / Conflict Trial 1
Imagine that in a town, two houses are on fire: a big house
with 100 people inside and a small house with 10 people
inside. In this town there is only one fire engine, so you
have to decide which of the two houses you will send the
fire engine to. You only have time to save one of the houses.
If you choose to send the fire engine to the small house,
you are certain to save exactly 10 out of the 10 people in that
house.
If you choose to send the fire engine to the big house, you
are certain to save exactly 11 out of the 100 people in that
house.
What house would you send the fire engine to?
Proportion Dominance / Harmony Trial 1
Imagine that in a forest there are two wild life reserves
where panda bears live: a small reserve with 10 pandas and
a big one with 100 pandas. A fire is burning in this forest
and will eventually consume all of it. The two reserves are
located far from each other, so you have time to try to save
only one of the reserves.
If you choose to go to the small reserve, you are certain
to save exactly 10 out of the 10 pandas in that reserve.
If you choose to go to the big reserve, you are certain to
save exactly 9 out of the 100 pandas in that reserve.
Which reserve would you choose to go to?
Proportion Dominance / Conflict Trial 2
An amusement park is nearing the final stages of planning
before construction when it is found that construction will
destroy some trees where an endangered species of songbird
nests. The planners are willing to adopt one of two proposed
solutions to the problem.
Program A saves 19 of the 25 birds that nest in Area A.
Program B saves 20 of the 400 birds that nest in Area B.
These programs are mutually exclusive and the only two
options available. Which would you choose?
Proportion Dominance / Harmony Trial 2
A species of plant found only in a remote area of New
Guinea is threatened with extinction by a recently intro-
duced species of vine. You have access to two treatments
that kill the vines and save the plants, but you only have
enough money to fund one program.
If you implement Program A, you will save 19 of the 25
plants located in Quadrant A.
If you implement Program B, you will save 18 of the 400
plants located in Quadrant B.
These programs are mutually exclusive and the only two
options available. Which would you choose?
Proportion Dominance / Conflict Trial 3
The current recession has forced companies to cut jobs.
Your office provides financial support to struggling busi-
nesses in the local economy, but limited resources force you
to choose which businesses to assist.
Program A saves 54 of the 60 jobs that would have other-
wise been lost at Factory A.
Program B saves 56 of the 560 jobs that would have oth-
erwise been lost at Factory B.
These programs are mutually exclusive and the only two
options available. Which would you choose?
Proportion Dominance / Harmony Trial 3
The city council is auctioning off two former nature pre-
serves for commercial development. The corporations that
buy the land will bulldoze the land and erect office buildings.
Your organization protects public spaces by purchasing lots
like these and preserving them. There is only enough money
to purchase a portion of the land up for auction.
If you implement Program A, you can purchase 54 of the
60 acres in Plot A, saving them from development.
If you implement Program B, you can purchase 52 of the
560 acres in Plot B, saving them from development.
These programs are mutually exclusive and the only two
options available. Which would you choose?
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Proportion Dominance / Conflict Trial 4
An oil spill around Puget Sound is threatening the sea otter
populations in two areas of the bay. Two cleanup plans are
proposed, but there is only enough money to support one
plan. So, there are only enough resources to save otters in
one of these areas of the bay.
Program A will save 120 of the 150 otters near the north
end of the bay.
Program B will save 124 of the 800 otters near the south
end of the bay.
These programs are mutually exclusive and the only two
options available. Which would you choose?
Proportion Dominance / Harmony Trial 4
Two areas off the southeast coast of Florida are heavily pop-
ulated with dolphins and tuna. Tuna fishermen accidentally
catch a number of dolphins in these areas every year. Dol-
phins that get caught in the tuna nets drown, because they
cannot surface to breathe. To combat this problem, new nets
have been designed that will save a number of dolphins. The
tuna fishing industry has agreed to fish with the new nets in
only one of these two areas.
Program A would require boats in Area A to use a differ-
ent type of net, which would save 120 of the 150 dolphins
that die in that area each year.
Program B would require boats in Area B to use a differ-
ent type of net, which would save 116 of the 800 dolphins
that die in that area each year.
These programs are mutually exclusive and the only two
options available. Which would you choose?
Proportion Dominance / Conflict Trial 5
You are on a committee at a major paper company with two
factories on a mid-sized river. These factories use water
from the river to cool their machines. Once used, the wa-
ter is exhausted back into the stream. This polluted water
causes a number of fish to die every year near the factory
from which it is exhausted. Filters can be installed that will
save a number of fish, but filter installation is expensive, and
there is only enough money in the budget to install filters at
one factory.
Program A filters the water exhausted from Factory A, re-
sulting in the prevention of 245 of the annual 350 fish deaths
due to pollution.
Program B filters the water exhausted from Factory B,
preventing 251 of the annual 980 fish deaths due to pollu-
tion.
These programs are mutually exclusive and the only two
options available. Which would you choose?
Proportion Dominance / Harmony Trial 5
Emergency medical aid is needed at two different sites in
a war-torn country. You are the head of the only medical
convoy in the area. There is only enough time, and there are
only enough supplies, to visit one camp.
Treating Camp A will save the lives of 245 of the 350
patients who would otherwise die.
Treating Camp B will save the lives of 239 of the 980
patients who would otherwise die.
These treatment programs are mutually exclusive and the
only two options available. Which would you choose?
CRT-Type Problems
A TV and a DVD together cost 88 dollars. The TV costs 80
dollars more than the DVD. How much does the DVD cost?
If it takes 10 hens 10 days to lay 10 eggs, how long would
it take 100 hens to lay 100 eggs?
A computer virus is spreading through the system of a
computer. Every minute, the number of infected files dou-
bles. If it takes 100 minutes for the virus to infect all of the
system, how long would it take for the virus to infect half of
the system?
Numeracy Scale
1) Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times.
Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die
would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?
2) In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning
a $10.00 prize is 1%. What is your best guess about how
many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each
buy a single ticket to BIG BUCKS?
3) In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the
chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of tick-
ets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?
4) Which of the following numbers represents the biggest
risk of getting a disease: 1 in 100, 1 in 1000, or 1 in 10?
5) Which of the following numbers represents the biggest
risk of getting a disease? 1% _____ 10% _____ 5% _____
6) If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years,
and person B’s risk is double that of A’s, what is B’s risk?
7) If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in
ten years, and person B’s risk is double that of A’s, what is
B’s risk?
8) If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many
people would be expected to get the disease: 8A) Out of
100? ________ 8B) Out of 1000? ________
9) If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this
would be the same as having a ____% chance of getting the
disease.
10) The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out
of 10,000 people, about how many of them are expected to
get infected?
